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# Amendment 84 - Mail Ballot Voter Identification
- URL: https://www.thecoloradoconservative.com/amendment-84-mail-ballot-voter-identification/
- Published: 2026-09-20T23:48:39.000Z
- Updated: 2026-09-20T23:48:39.000Z
- Author: Eric Phelan

# OFFICIAL BALLOT QUESTION

*"Shall there be an amendment to the Colorado Constitution requiring a voter to sign and include the last four digits of their social security number or their Colorado driver’s license or identification card number on the outside of their mail ballot for any federal or state election, and, in connection therewith, allowing the voter to correct missing or incorrect information, including with alternative forms of identification; and prohibiting a county clerk and recorder from counting the mail ballot unless the problem is fixed?"*

**Source Colorado Secretary of State certified 2026 ballot list**

# NEUTRAL OVERVIEW

Amendment 84 would add a mail-ballot identification requirement to the Colorado Constitution for federal or statewide elections. A voter would have to sign the ballot affirmation and provide either the last four digits of a Social Security number, a Colorado REAL ID number, a Colorado REAL ID driver’s license number, or the last four digits of another Colorado identification number that satisfies federal REAL ID requirements. Election officials would compare the information with the statewide voter-registration database.  
  
If information is missing, incomplete, or cannot be matched, the county clerk or designated election official must notify the voter and explain how to correct the discrepancy. The ballot cannot be counted unless the discrepancy is cured. Most affected voters could cure by submitting an accepted identification document in person or digitally. Certain voters covered by federal accessibility law could use the broader identification options already accepted under Colorado law.  
  
A YES vote adds this constitutional verification step to the existing mail-ballot process. A NO vote leaves the current system, including registration controls, signature review, notice, and cure procedures, without the new identifying-number requirement. The measure does not itself set detailed privacy, data-retention, training, cost, or statewide implementation rules.

# THE PROPONENT CASE

Supporters argue that mail voting should use more than one identity check. Matching a government-issued identifier or partial Social Security number to the voter-registration record would create an objective verification point in addition to signature review. They contend that layered safeguards can deter impersonation, identify questionable returns, and make the process easier to audit.  
  
Proponents also emphasize public confidence. Some voters distrust signature matching because it involves human judgment and may not be readily understood outside election offices. A uniform statewide credential check, they argue, gives voters a straightforward explanation of how a returned ballot is tied to a registered voter. The required notice and cure process is intended to protect eligible voters who omit information or make an honest mistake.

# THE OPPONENT CASE

Opponents argue that Colorado already verifies mail ballots and that the amendment creates another reason to withhold an otherwise valid vote. Eligible ballots could be delayed or rejected because a voter lacks the requested number, copies it incorrectly, has an outdated database record, misses a notice, or cannot complete the cure process in time. The burden may fall unevenly on older voters, people with disabilities, low-income voters, rural residents, and people with limited digital access.  
  
They also raise privacy and administration concerns. Requiring identifying numbers on the returned-ballot affirmation increases the amount of sensitive information handled by postal systems, election workers, vendors, and county offices. Opponents contend that statewide rules for masking, storage, access, and destruction should be settled before creating a constitutional mandate. They argue that the added cost and risk of rejected ballots may exceed any security benefit if confirmed impersonation is uncommon.

# OFFICIAL MEASURE INFORMATION

| **Item**                       | **Official listing**                                                 |
| ------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Approval required**          | 55 percent because the measure would amend the Colorado Constitution |
| **Designated representatives** | Chuck Broerman and Suzanne Taheri of West Group                      |
| **Registered in support**      | Colorado Voter Trust Initiative                                      |
| **Registered in opposition**   | Defend our Ballots Issue Committee                                   |

*Committee listings can change. Current listing and full contact information Colorado Secretary of State*

**THE COLORADO CONSERVATIVE RECOMMENDS: YES**

# WHY WE RECOMMEND YES

We recommend YES because convenient voting and reliable identity verification can coexist. A mail-ballot system depends on public confidence that each counted ballot came from an eligible registered voter. An objective database match adds a distinct safeguard rather than relying solely on a signature comparison.

The cure requirement is central to our support. A missing digit, transcription error, database mismatch, or honest misunderstanding should trigger notice and a practical opportunity to correct the record, not automatic disenfranchisement. Instructions must be plain, notices prompt, digital and in-person options accessible, and county practices consistent.

Our caution is privacy and execution. Election officials will be responsible for protecting identifying numbers from unnecessary exposure, limiting access, preventing their appearance in public records, and destroying or masking data when retention is no longer legally required. The state must also demonstrate that the new check catches meaningful problems rather than merely increasing cure notices and rejected ballots.  
  
On balance, the combination of an objective match and a mandatory cure process can strengthen election integrity without sacrificing lawful votes, but only if implementation treats ballot access and data security as equal obligations. The Colorado Conservative recommends YES.

# HOW WE REACHED THE SCORES

Each category uses five tests worth 0 to 10 points. The fixed anchors are: 0 for clear harm or failure; 2 for a material weakness; 5 for mixed or neutral evidence; 8 for a clear benefit with workable safeguards; and 10 for an exceptional benefit with strong controls. Intermediate whole numbers are used only when the evidence falls between anchors.

| **Category**                  | **Points** | **Stars** |
| ----------------------------- | ---------- | --------- |
| **Fiscal Responsibility**     | 31/50      | ★★★☆☆     |
| **Limited Government**        | 32/50      | ★★★☆☆     |
| **Individual Liberty**        | 31/50      | ★★★☆☆     |
| **Institutional Integrity**   | 45/50      | ★★★★★     |
| **Long-Term Colorado Impact** | 40/50      | ★★★★☆     |

## FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY 31 OF 50 ★★★☆☆

*The measure may reduce some verification risk, but county implementation, notice, cure, technology, and legal costs are not specified.*

| **Test**                | **Pts** | **Evidence and reason**                                                                                                        |
| ----------------------- | ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Direct state cost       | 6       | The text creates no tax or benefit program, but statewide rulemaking, systems, training, and oversight will require resources. |
| County implementation   | 4       | Clerks may face equipment, software, workflow, staffing, and secure-data-handling costs not specified in the text.             |
| Notice and cure expense | 5       | More flagged ballots may increase postage, communications, document review, and temporary staffing.                            |
| Error and fraud control | 8       | An objective database match can reduce some verification risk and associated investigation costs.                              |
| Cost transparency       | 8       | The process generates countable events, allowing implementation costs and results to be audited by election.                   |
| Metric total            | 31      | ★★★☆☆                                                                                                                          |

## LIMITED GOVERNMENT 32 OF 50 ★★★☆☆

*The rule is narrow and statewide, but it constitutionalizes a new voter-data mandate and leaves privacy controls to implementation.*

| **Test**                    | **Pts** | **Evidence and reason**                                                                                                       |
| --------------------------- | ------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Narrow governmental purpose | 8       | The requirement is limited to authenticating returned mail ballots in federal or statewide elections.                         |
| New state mandate           | 4       | The Constitution would compel voters and counties to use an additional verification process.                                  |
| Statewide uniformity        | 8       | One statewide rule can reduce county-by-county differences in the required credential check.                                  |
| Data minimization           | 4       | The measure requires sensitive identifying information but does not specify masking, access, retention, or destruction rules. |
| Cure and recourse           | 8       | Officials must notify voters and offer in-person or digital correction before counting is denied.                             |
| Metric total                | 32      | ★★★☆☆                                                                                                                         |

## INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY 31 OF 50 ★★★☆☆

*The amendment can protect confidence in each lawful vote, but privacy exposure and an unsuccessful cure could prevent an eligible ballot from counting.*

| **Test**                       | **Pts** | **Evidence and reason**                                                                                                        |
| ------------------------------ | ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| Protection of lawful votes     | 6       | The cure process protects many honest errors, but an unresolved discrepancy prevents the ballot from counting.                 |
| Notice and opportunity to cure | 9       | The Constitution would require notice and a defined opportunity to provide acceptable identification.                          |
| Privacy and data security      | 3       | Sensitive identifiers enter the return process without express constitutional rules for masking or retention.                  |
| Equal practical access         | 6       | Digital and in-person cure options help, but access burdens may differ by disability, location, income, and technology.        |
| Confidence in each vote        | 7       | A successful objective match can strengthen voters’ assurance that counted mail ballots are attributable to registered voters. |
| Metric total                   | 31      | ★★★☆☆                                                                                                                          |

## INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY 45 OF 50 ★★★★★

*The measure creates an objective, auditable verification rule with mandatory notice and cure, subject to execution and data-security risks.*

| **Test**                  | **Pts** | **Evidence and reason**                                                                              |
| ------------------------- | ------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Objective verification    | 10      | A credential-to-database match supplies a clear verification event distinct from signature review.   |
| Database confirmation     | 9       | Election judges must confirm supplied information against the statewide voter-registration database. |
| Mandatory notice and cure | 9       | The text requires notice and permits correction rather than immediate rejection.                     |
| Auditability              | 9       | Missing data, mismatches, notices, cures, and uncounted ballots can be measured and reviewed.        |
| Statewide consistency     | 8       | A constitutional baseline can promote uniform rules, although county execution may still vary.       |
| Metric total              | 45      | ★★★★★                                                                                                |

## LONG-TERM COLORADO IMPACT 40 OF 50 ★★★★☆

*A consistent identification layer may strengthen durable confidence, but technology, privacy, and access practices must remain adaptable.*

| **Test**                            | **Pts** | **Evidence and reason**                                                                                                     |
| ----------------------------------- | ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Public confidence                   | 9       | A visible additional identity check may improve durable confidence among voters concerned about mail-ballot authentication. |
| Verification durability             | 9       | The constitutional rule creates a stable minimum standard across future election cycles.                                    |
| Administrative consistency          | 8       | The same core requirement applies statewide, with implementation details still requiring coordination.                      |
| Technology and privacy adaptability | 6       | The Constitution does not explain how security practices should evolve as systems and threats change.                       |
| Access and integrity balance        | 8       | Notice, cure, and accessibility alternatives provide safeguards if they are timely and consistently administered.           |
| Metric total                        | 40      | ★★★★☆                                                                                                                       |

## OVERALL RESULT

| **Five-category total** | **Normalized score** | **Overall stars** | **Recommendation** |
| ----------------------- | -------------------- | ----------------- | ------------------ |
| 179/250                 | 36/50                | ★★★★☆             | YES                |

**The result supports a YES recommendation because the amendment adds an objective identity check and requires notice and correction before a ballot is rejected. The recommendation depends on uniform administration, strong privacy controls, accessible cure options, and public reporting that measures both security results and the number of eligible ballots left uncounted.**

## WHAT WE WILL HOLD GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE FOR

Whatever the election result, the publication will revisit this measure after every affected election. We will test whether the new requirement produces measurable verification benefits without exposing personal information or causing eligible voters to lose their ballots through preventable errors.

## HOW WE WILL DO IT

1\. Establish a dated baseline. Before implementation, record county-level mail ballots returned, ballots flagged under existing verification rules, notices issued, cures completed, ballots left uncounted, processing time, verification-related referrals, and documented administrative costs. Use rates per 10,000 returned ballots so counties and elections can be compared fairly.

2\. Review every affected election. Publish a pre-election implementation check, a preliminary review after certification, and a final review when cure, canvass, audit, and available litigation records are complete. Continue for at least three statewide election cycles.

3\. Audit notices, cures, and uncounted ballots. Report how many ballots were flagged for missing, incomplete, or unmatched information; when notices were sent; which cure channels were offered; how many voters cured successfully; and how many ballots remained uncounted. Compare results by county and with the pre-amendment baseline without publishing personal identifiers.

4\. Measure security results precisely. Report documented cases in which the new check identified a duplicate, ineligible, fraudulent, or otherwise invalid return; distinguish referrals from confirmed violations; and separate problems caught by the new identifier from those already detected through signature review or other controls.

5\. Test privacy, access, and uniformity. Track breaches, improper disclosure, public-record exposure, misdirected notices, database mismatches, accessibility complaints, and material differences among counties. Review masking, access logs, retention, destruction, staff training, vendor controls, and accommodations required by federal and state law.

6\. Follow the money and publish the record. Compare equipment, software, staffing, training, postage, notice, cure, legal, and public-education costs with official estimates and the baseline. Each review will link to available public records, explain limitations, report favorable and unfavorable results, and issue dated corrections when needed.

*Primary accountability records: Secretary of State election rules and directives, county canvass and aggregate cure records, risk-limiting audit materials, county clerk procedures, public security and privacy reports, legislative records, and court dockets. Core sources: sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/ and coloradosos.gov/pubs/elections/Initiatives/ballot/contacts/2026.html.*

# APPENDIX EXACT TEXT OF INITIATIVE 362

**Source Colorado Secretary of State final text of Initiative 362**

*Be it enacted by the People of the State of Colorado:*

SECTION 1\. In the constitution of the state of Colorado, add Section 13 to article VII as follows:

*Section 13\. Voter Authentication*

(1) FOR ANY FEDERAL OR STATEWIDE ELECTION, A VOTER IS REQUIRED TO AFFIX THEIR SIGNATURE AND INCLUDE EITHER THE LAST FOUR DIGITS OF THEIR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OR COLORADO REAL IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OR COLORADO REAL IDENTIFICATION DRIVER’S LICENSE NUMBER, AS CODIFIED IN 49 U.S.C. SEC. 30301 NOTE OR ITS SUCCESSOR SECTION AND SECTIONS 42-2-101, 42-2-301, AND 42-2-402 OR THEIR SUCCESSOR SECTIONS, ON THE SELF-AFFIRMATION OF A RETURNED MAIL BALLOT. A VOTER MAY ALTERNATIVELY INCLUDE THE LAST FOUR DIGITS OF ANOTHER FORM OF COLORADO IDENTIFICATION THAT MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE FEDERAL REAL ID ACT OF 2005 OR SUCCESSOR LEGISLATION. IF THE VOTER FAILS TO FILL OUT ALL OR PART OF THE REQUIRED AFFIRMATION, OR IF AN ELECTION JUDGE IS UNABLE TO CONFIRM THAT THE INFORMATION PROVIDED MATCHES THE VOTER’S INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION DATABASE, THE COUNTY CLERK AND RECORDER OR OTHER DESIGNATED ELECTION OFFICIAL MUST SEND NOTICE TO THE VOTER INFORMING THEM OF THE PROCESS TO CORRECT THE DISCREPANCY. THE COUNTY CLERK AND RECORDER SHALL NOT COUNT THE BALLOT UNTIL THE DISCREPANCY IS CORRECTED.

(2) A DISCREPANCY MAY BE CORRECTED BY PROVIDING A COPY OF THE VOTER’S IDENTIFICATION IN SUBSECTION (1) OF THIS SECTION, US PASSPORT, US MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD, OR TRIBAL PHOTO IDENTIFICATION, IN PERSON OR DIGITALLY, TO THE COUNTY CLERK AND RECORDER OR OTHER DESIGNATED ELECTION OFFICIAL.

(3) NOTWITHSTANDING SUBSECTION (2) OF THIS SECTION, A VOTER WHO IS PROVIDED THE RIGHT TO VOTE OTHERWISE THAN IN PERSON UNDER SECTION (b)(2)(B)(ii) OF THE FEDERAL “VOTING ACCESSIBILITY FOR THE ELDERLY AND HANDICAPPED ACT”, 52 U.S.C. SEC. 20102 ET SEQ., MAY PROVIDE ANY FORM OF IDENTIFICATION DEEMED ACCEPTABLE UNDER SECTION 1-1-104 (19.5) OR ITS SUCCESSOR TO CORRECT A DISCREPANCY.